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INTRODUCTION 
In 1810, Napoleon captured an American ship, strapped arms to it, 
and absorbed it into the French naval fleet. When two American 
citizens sought to recover the vessel, a unanimous Court relied on 
customary international law and held France, as a foreign sovereign, 
was exempt from suit.1 Since then, foreign sovereign immunity has 
been a staple of both American common law and international law. 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) is the modern 
United States law.2 
Foreign sovereigns are generally immune from suit.3 Recently, the 
commercial-activity exception4 has become a significant point of 
contention in the federal courts.5 This exception allows a foreign 
sovereign to be sued in cases where “the action is based upon a 
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 1.  Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146–47 (1812) (holding that 
foreign sovereign immunity, as exemplified in customary international law, applied to a vessel 
owned by American citizens that was seized by the French military and removed the former 
owners’ claim over the ship). 
 2.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602–11 (2012). 
 3.  Id. § 1604; but see id. §§ 1605–1605A (establishing exceptions to foreign sovereign 
immunity). 
 4.  Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 5.  See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (holding a contract with an 
instrumentality of a foreign sovereign is insufficient to satisfy the exception); Republic of 
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding a foreign sovereign is not liable under 
the exception when it regulates foreign currency exchange); Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429 
F.3d 288 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding a ticket sale by a third party in the United States is sufficient 
to satisfy the commercial-activity exception); Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(same). 
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commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign 
state.”6 However, courts still wrestle with two key issues: first, what 
makes a claim “based upon” a commercial activity7; and second, when 
are actions of non-sovereign entities attributable to foreign 
sovereigns.8 OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs addresses these two 
questions.9 
This commentary will detail the facts of the case and then proceed 
with the legal background of foreign sovereign immunity. Next, it will 
outline the Ninth Circuit’s en banc holding. Then it will relate each 
party’s arguments regarding the two issues on appeal. Finally, after 
analyzing the competing arguments, it concludes that the Supreme 
Court will likely reverse the lower court, holding that although the 
claim is “based upon” a commercial activity, the commercial activity 
of a separate entity cannot be imputed to the foreign state. OBB is 
immune under FSIA. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
OBB, as a national rail service, operates solely within the Republic 
of Austria.10 It is an “agency or instrumentality” of Austria and 
therefore constitutes “a sovereign state” under FSIA.11 Along with 
other European rail services, OBB is a member of the Eurail Group, 
an association organized under Luxembourg law.12 The Eurail Group 
markets and sells rail passes for these European rail services,13 
 
 6.  § 1605(a)(2). 
 7.  Compare Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 292 (“establish[ing] a fact without which the plaintiff 
will lose” will suffice for the “based upon” requirement) with Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 
F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding the “based upon” requirement is satisfied when a “degree 
of closeness” exists “between the commercial activity and the gravamen of the plaintiff’s 
complaint”). 
 8.  Compare First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 
462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (holding a foreign sovereign can be liable for actions performed by a 
state-owned corporation only when the entity is “so extensively controlled by its owner that a 
relationship of principal and agent is created” or when blindly recognizing separate legal status 
“would work fraud or injustice”) (citations omitted) with Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 290 (holding that 
a ticket sale performed by a travel agency in the United States for a foreign sovereign’s state-
owned airline is considered a commercial activity in order to trigger liability under 
§ 1605(a)(2)). 
 9.  135 S. Ct. 1172 (2015). 
 10.  Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert granted 
sub nom. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S. Ct. 1172 (2015). 
 11.  Id. at 591; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)–(b) (2012). 
 12.  Sachs, 737 F.3d at 587. 
 13.  Id. 
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sometimes using third-party sales agents.14 One such agent is Rail Pass 
Experts (“RPE”), a Massachusetts-based company.15 OBB is not 
involved in the day-to-day operations of either the Eurail Group or 
RPE.16 
In March 2007, Plaintiff Carol Sachs bought a Eurail pass from 
RPE’s website to travel in Austria and the Czech Republic on an 
OBB train.17 In April, when Sachs tried to board the train, she fell 
onto the tracks while the train was moving, crushing her legs.18 A year 
later, Sachs filed suit against OBB, OBB Holding, and the Republic of 
Austria.19 Plaintiff alleged five causes of action: negligence, design 
defect, failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, 
and breach of implied warranty of fitness.20 The district court for the 
Northern District of California dismissed the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, ruling that Sachs did not sufficiently show that 
OBB was liable under the commercial-activity exception.21 Sachs then 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.22 
A divided three-judge panel affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.23 
On rehearing en banc, the majority reversed the panel’s decision. 
OBB subsequently filed for a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, which the Court granted on January 23, 2015.24 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Historical Overview of Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Foreign sovereign immunity first emerged in The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon.25 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief 
Justice Marshall looked to customary international law to determine 
 
 14.  Brief for Petitioner at 11, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S. Apr. 
17, 2015). 
 15.  Sachs, 737 F.3d at 587. 
 16.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 11; see Brief for Respondent at 4–5, OBB 
Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S. June 29, 2015). 
 17.  Sachs, 737 F.3d at 587. 
 18.  Id. at 588. 
 19.  Id. The Republic of Austria was dismissed from the suit after Sachs failed to oppose its 
motion to dismiss. Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S. Ct. 1172 (2015). 
 25.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
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the scope of foreign sovereign immunity.26 The Court found three 
examples of cases where sovereign immunity arises: cases involving 
foreign sovereign officials,27 cases involving foreign ambassadors,28 and 
cases in which the domestic country allows a foreign military to enter 
its territory.29 The third example applied to The Schooner Exchange 
because the ship was a part of the French naval fleet when the suit 
began.30 Marshall concluded this immunity is a reasonable legal rule 
under international comity; questions of whether a foreign sovereign 
may be subject to suit are “questions of policy [rather] than of law . . . 
[and] they are diplomatic, rather than legal discussion[s].”31 
After The Schooner Exchange, a two-step process determined 
foreign sovereign immunity.32 A sovereign could “request a 
‘suggestion of immunity’ from the State Department,” which the 
executive branch would grant if prudent.33 If the sovereign failed to 
request the suggestion from the State Department, or if the State 
Department denied a request, a court could nonetheless decide if 
immunity existed.34 The court would determine “whether the ground 
of immunity is one which it is the established policy of the [State 
Department] to recognize.”35 
Initially, the State Department encouraged courts to grant 
immunity to all “friendly foreign sovereigns.”36 However, in 1952, the 
State Department changed course and embraced the “restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity.”37 Under the restrictive theory, “a state 
is immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its sovereign or 
 
 26.  Id. at 136–46 (“In exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if any, aids from precedents or 
written law, the [C]ourt has found it necessary to rely much on general principles, and on a train 
of reasoning founded on cases in some degree analogous to this.”). 
 27.  Id. at 137. This is the general principle of foreign official immunity, which is not 
included in the FSIA. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). 
 28.  Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 138. 
 29.  Id. at 139. 
 30.  Id. at 118. 
 31.  Id. at 146. 
 32.  Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311 (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587–89 
(1943)). 
 33.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 312 (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)) (alterations 
in original). 
 36.  See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (recounting the 
history of the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine). 
 37.  Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting 
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep’t of State Bull. 984–85 
(1952). 
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public acts (jure imperii), but not as to those that are private or 
commercial in character (jure gestionis).”38 In other words, rather than 
allowing its allies absolute immunity as it had before, the United 
States shifted to a policy of allowing immunity for sovereign acts 
(such as policing and imprisonment)39 but not for commercial acts 
(such as advertising for a cultural tour).40 
B.  FSIA Emerges 
Congress enacted FSIA for “two well-recognized and related 
purposes”: (1) “adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign 
immunity” and (2) “codification of international law at the time of the 
FSIA’s enactment.”41 The Act established “a comprehensive set of 
legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action 
against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies or 
instrumentalities” to determine foreign sovereign immunity.42 
FSIA grants immunity for all foreign sovereigns,43 unless the case 
falls under an exception, the most significant of which is the 
commercial-activity exception.44 This exception reads: 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case— 
. . . . 
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon 
an act performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an 
act outside the territory of the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 
that act causes a direct effect in the United States[.]45 
Looking to nature rather than purpose, the Act defines 
“commercial activity” as “a regular course of commercial conduct or a 
particular commercial transaction or act.”46 Furthermore, FSIA 
 
 38.  Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359–60 (1993) (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487). 
 39.  Id. at 361. 
 40.  See Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 41.  Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 
199 (2007). 
 42.  Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. 
 43.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012). 
 44.  Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992). 
 45.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 46. Id. § 1603(d). 
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defines “commercial activity carried on in the United States by a 
foreign state” as a commercial activity that (1) is “carried on by such 
state” and (2) has “substantial contact with the United States.”47 
Under FSIA, an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” 
satisfies the definition of a “foreign state.”48 An “agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state” must be (1) “a separate legal 
person, corporate or otherwise”; (2) “an organ of a foreign state or 
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other 
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof”; and (3) “neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . , 
nor created under the laws of any third country.”49 
C.  The “Based Upon” Requirement of the Commercial-Activity 
Exception 
The Supreme Court has held that a claim is “based upon” a 
commercial activity for purposes of § 1605(a)(2) where the 
commercial activity is part of “those elements of a claim that, if 
proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the 
case.”50 This does not mean that “each and every element of a claim 
[must] be commercial activity by a foreign state.”51 Rather, the claim is 
not based upon the commercial activity if such activity has nothing to 
do with the action. For example, an airplane lease cannot be the basis 
for a tort claim that does not assert “any rights under the lease as a 
third party beneficiary or otherwise” related to the contract.52 Exactly 
how close the commercial activity must be to the claim is an open 
question among the circuit courts.53 Some courts have held that a 
claim is based upon a commercial activity “so long as the alleged 
commercial activity establishes a fact without which the plaintiff will 
lose.”54 Others have held that a claim is only based upon the 
commercial activity “when there exists ‘a degree of closeness’ 
 
 47.  Id. § 1603(e). 
 48.  Id. § 1603(a). 
 49.  Id. § 1603(b). 
 50.  Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993). 
 51.  Id. at 358 n.4. 
 52.  Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 53.  Compare Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005) with EM 
Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir.  2015). 
 54.  Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 292 (emphasis added). 
ECHEVERRI 11.15.15 - FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015  1:52 PM 
2015] SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION 7 
between the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint and the commercial 
activities engaged in by the foreign state or instrumentality.”55 
D.  Attribution and Agency under the Commercial-Activity Exception 
Foreign sovereigns often use third parties instead of directly 
engaging in commercial activity. This complicates the determination 
of what qualifies as a commercial activity “by a foreign state.” In these 
situations, the question is whether a court can attribute actions of 
entities or persons not considered part of the foreign state to the state 
for liability.56 Circuit courts have either followed the Court’s holding 
in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de 
Cuba (“Bancec”)57 or applied common law principles of agency.58 
In Bancec, the Court held that although government 
instrumentalities should be treated as unique entities separate from 
the sovereign,59 traditional corporate law principles support 
overcoming this presumption in two circumstances.60 First, when the 
entity is “so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of 
principal and agent is created.”61 Second, “when to [blindly] do so 
would work fraud or injustice.”62 
On the other hand, traditional agency law principles hold that an 
agency relationship exists when two parties consent to such a 
relationship.63 This association does not hinge solely on the intent of 
the parties; so long as there is an agreement, the relationship exists.64 
Furthermore, when an agent has more than one principal, it may, “in 
any particular matter, act as an agent on behalf of only one principal,” 
provided all the principals consent to the multiple relationships.65 
The Supreme Court addressed attribution under FSIA in two 
other recent cases. In Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,66 several chemical 
companies, which were once partially owned by Israeli state-owned 
 
 55.  EM, 800 F.3d at 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). 
 56.  See Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of China, 822 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 57.  462 U.S. 611 (1983). 
 58.  Compare Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 1992) with 
Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 292. 
 59.  Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983). 
 60.  Id. at 629. 
 61.  Id. (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402–04 (1960)). 
 62.  Id. (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939)). 
 63.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). 
 64.  Id. at cmt. b. 
 65.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.14, cmt. b (2006). 
 66.  538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
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companies, tried to claim sovereign immunity as instrumentalities of 
Israel. The Court rejected this argument because it would “ignore 
corporate formalities and use the colloquial sense of [the] term 
[ownership].”67 Mere subsidiaries “of an instrumentality [are] not 
[themselves] entitled to instrumentality status” under FSIA.68 
In Samantar v. Yousuf,69 the ex-Prime Minister of Somalia claimed 
FSIA applied to him as a former official of the foreign sovereign 
through the definition of “agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state.”70 The Court rejected this argument, stating that although “[the 
proposed] interpretation is literally possible, [the] analysis of the 
entire statutory text persuades [the Court] that [this] reading is not 
the meaning that Congress enacted.”71 The Court held that, because 
the definitional statute “refers to an organization, rather than an 
individual,”72 “an official acting on behalf of the foreign state” cannot 
be considered an “agency or instrumentality” for the purposes of 
foreign sovereign immunity.73 
III. HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held OBB liable under the 
commercial-activity exception of FSIA.74 
The court first addressed whether RPE’s ticket sale to Sachs could 
be attributed to OBB and therefore considered “commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state” under the 
commercial-activity exception.75 The majority rejected OBB’s 
argument that an agent must first satisfy the definition of “agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state” under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) before 
applying common law principles of agency.76 The court found that the 
definitional statute had nothing to do with the question of attributing 
RPE’s actions to OBB.77 The court reasoned that the definition of 
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” determines “what type 
 
 67.  Id. at 474. 
 68.  Id. at 473. 
 69.  560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 70.  Id. at 309. 
 71.  Id. at 315. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 319. 
 74.  Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 603 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 75.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 595. 
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of entity can be considered a foreign state for purposes of claiming 
sovereign immunity”78 and does not determine attribution.79 
The court looked to traditional agency law principles to determine 
if there was a relationship between OBB and RPE.80 Because the 
Eurail Group sells tickets for OBB and because Eurail uses subagents 
for some of these sales, the majority found that “Eurail Group’s use of 
these subagents establishes a legal relationship between OBB (the 
principal) and RPE (the subagent).”81 Consequently, the majority 
found that RPE’s ticket sale to Sachs could be attributed to OBB 
through the Eurail Group.82 Thus, OBB “carried on commercial 
activity in the United States.”83 
The court then focused on “whether the claims of Sachs are ‘based 
upon’ this commercial activity” or on her injuries that occurred in 
Austria.84 The court held the “based upon” requirement is satisfied “if 
an element of [her] claim consists in conduct that occurred in 
commercial activity carried on in the United States.”85 Furthermore, 
the majority considered each of Sachs’s five claims and found them all 
based upon OBB’s commercial activity.86 
Accordingly, because the court found Sachs’s claims to be based 
upon commercial activity and that RPE’s ticket sale in the United 
States could be attributed to OBB based on common-law principles 
of agency, the Ninth Circuit reversed and reinstated all five of Sachs’s 
claims.87 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  OBB’s Arguments 
First, OBB argues the “based upon” requirement of the 
commercial-activity exception refers to the gravamen of the 
complaint, and therefore Sachs’s claims fail because they are “based 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. (citing Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1460 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 80.  Id. at 593. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
 84.  Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 599 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 85.  Id. (quoting Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis in original). 
 86.  Id. at 602 (citation omitted). 
 87.  Id. at 603. 
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upon” the accident in Austria, not any commercial activity in the 
United States.88 Second, OBB then claims that even if the ticket sale 
was commercial activity, it was not performed “by the foreign state” 
because RPE cannot be considered an agency of Austria under either 
FSIA’s definition of “agency or instrumentality,”89 or the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bancec.90 OBB submits the Court should reverse 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision.91 
1.  “Based Upon” Refers to the Gravamen of the Complaint 
OBB reads the Court’s holding in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson92 to 
mean the “based upon” requirement refers to “the gravamen of the 
complaint.”93 Therefore, Sachs’s claim should be dismissed because it 
is based upon her accident in Austria, not the ticket sale.94 OBB claims 
that Sachs’s case is analogous to Nelson. In Nelson, the plaintiff 
asserted the commercial-activity exception applied to his action 
regarding his arrest, beating, and torture by foreign police because it 
resulted from a contract he signed in the United States.95 The Court 
held that, “[w]hile [the contract] led to the conduct that eventually 
injured the [him], [it is] not the basis for [his] suit.”96 By this logic, 
although Sachs’s ticket purchase may have led to the injuries she 
sustained, it “is not the basis for her suit.”97 Her injuries are “based 
upon” her activity on the train platform in Austria.98 
According to OBB, if Sachs’s claim were upheld, foreign 
sovereigns would be exposed to the artful pleading the Court sought 
to avoid in Nelson.99 The Court, in Nelson, refused “[t]o give 
jurisdictional significance to this feint of language” because it “would 
effectively thwart the Act’s manifest purpose to codify the restrictive 
theory of foreign sovereign immunity.”100 OBB argues that if an online 
ticket sale in the United States is a basis for tort claims regarding 
 
 88.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 28–38. 
 89.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012). 
 90.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 38–64. 
 91.  Id. at 64. 
 92.  507 U.S. 349 (1993). 
 93.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 29 (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358). 
 94.  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S. 
July 28, 2015). 
 95.  Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 32. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363. 
 100.  Id. 
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incidents occurring outside of the United States, then artful pleading 
will blur clear legal lines.101 OBB contends that Sachs’s claim “is 
merely a semantic ploy” to give her action some semblance of 
legitimacy.102 
OBB rejects Sachs’s “one-element” test—under which “based 
upon” refers to just one element of the plaintiff’s claim103—because it 
would treat foreign sovereigns like private parties, contrary to the 
purpose of FSIA.104 Although, according to the restrictive theory, 
sovereigns should be treated like private parties when they perform 
private actions, “[i]t does not mean that foreign states and private 
parties are treated alike for all purposes.”105 
2.  Attribution is Determined by § 1603(b) or Bancec 
Even if the Court finds Sachs’s claim is based upon the ticket sale, 
OBB argues that RPE’s actions cannot be imputed to it.106 OBB 
asserts that because FSIA controls with respect to foreign sovereign 
immunity, the Act’s definitions determine attribution.107 
Because FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a 
foreign state,”108 OBB argues that the definition of “agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state” leaves no room for common law 
agents.109 Under this definition, an agency exists if it is: 
a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise . . . an organ of a 
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of 
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
state or political subdivision thereof . . . [and] neither a citizen of a 
State of the United States . . . , nor created under the laws of any 
third country.110 
RPE does not satisfy the definition of an agency under § 1603(b). 
OBB argues that because the plain language of the statute controls, 
 
 101.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 35. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 37–51. See infra Section IV.B.1 for a full 
discussion of the one-element test. 
 104.  Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 10–12. 
 105.  Id. at 11. 
 106.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 38. 
 107.  Id. at 25–26. 
 108.  Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (quoting Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)). 
 109.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 40•41. 
 110.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012). 
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RPE is not an agency of Austria, and therefore its actions cannot be 
attributed to OBB. 
Alternatively, OBB argues that Bancec’s two-pronged test should 
apply.111 If the Court is to look outside FSIA, then this “inquiry should 
be dictated by the precepts of the restrictive theory of [foreign 
sovereign immunity] that Congress sought to codify.”112 OBB does not 
have any control over RPE.113 The only possible relationship between 
OBB and RPE may be as “a subagent of an unidentified general sales 
agent accredited by the Eurail Group, not OBB itself.”114 And even 
then, the Eurail Group is comprised of thirty European rail services, 
so it can hardly be said that OBB exercised sufficient control over the 
Eurail Group to establish liability.115 Furthermore, OBB did not create 
this relationship in order to “work fraud or injustice”; in fact, “there 
[is] no evidence that OBB even knew RPE existed prior to the filing 
of this suit.”116 
Finally, OBB argues that the Ninth Circuit’s holding would lead to 
an inconsistent application of jurisdiction between foreign sovereigns 
and foreign private parties.117 The Court held in Daimler AG v. 
Bauman118 that federal courts could not assert general personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign company unless “that corporation’s 
affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to 
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”119 However, under 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case, a court may assert jurisdiction 
over a foreign state if there is a connection between it and another 
company that markets in the United States.120 If the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding persists, it “would create the untenable anomaly that it is 
easier for a plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction in the courts of the United 
States over a foreign state than a foreign corporation.”121 
 
 111.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 50–55. 
 112.  Id. at 50. 
 113.  Id. at 53 (“[T]here is no evidence, or even allegation, that OBB exercised any degree of 
direction or control, or element of control, over RPE.”). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 61–64. 
 118.  134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 119.  Id. at 761 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). 
 120.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 61 (“A foreign-state owned common carrier, 
such as a railway or airline, engages in commercial activity in the United States when it sells 
tickets in the United States through a travel agent.”) (quoting Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 
F.2d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). 
 121.  Id. at 63. 
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B.  Sachs’s Arguments 
Sachs contends that FSIA’s “based upon” requirement is satisfied 
either when a general “course of conduct” results in substantial 
contact with the United States,122 or when one element of a claim has 
substantial contact with the United States.123 Sachs also asserts that 
common law agency principles require that RPE’s ticket sale be 
attributed to OBB, satisfying the definition of “commercial activity.”124 
1.  “Based Upon” Refers to a General Course of Conduct or One 
Element of the Action 
According to Sachs, the term “activity” in “commercial activity” 
means the Court should focus on the entire enterprise of OBB, not 
just the specific act at issue.125 Sachs distinguishes the first clause of 
the commercial-activity exception, which is at issue here, with its sister 
clauses. The first clause refers to “based upon a commercial activity,” 
whereas the latter two are “based upon an act” related to commercial 
activity.126 Furthermore, “commercial activity” is defined as “a regular 
course of commercial conduct.”127 Therefore, if this regular course of 
commercial conduct has a substantial contact with the United States, 
it falls under the commercial-activity exception.128 
Moreover, because commercial activity must have a “substantial 
contact with the United States, there is already a requirement for 
some geographical nexus in the first clause of the commercial-activity 
exception.”129 If “based upon” also included a geographical 
requirement, then “the statute’s ‘substantial contact’ requirement 
would become superfluous.”130 
Even if the Court rejects Sachs’s “general course of conduct” 
argument, she also claims that Saudi Arabia v. Nelson requires only 
that the commercial act “constitut[e] one element of the plaintiff’s 
 
 122.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 24–36. 
 123.  Id. at 37–51. 
 124.  Id. at 12–23. 
 125.  Id. at 24. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012). 
 128.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 25; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (“A ‘commercial 
activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state’ means commercial activity carried on 
by such state and having substantial contact with the United States.”). 
 129.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 29. 
 130.  Id. 
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action.”131 In Nelson, the Court held that “based upon” referred to 
“those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to 
relief under his theory of the case.”132 In that case, none of the 
elements of Nelson’s claims stemmed from the commercial activity of 
his employment contract, and therefore the Court found that his 
action did not satisfy the “based upon” requirement.133 Although 
Sachs concedes that Nelson did not explicitly adopt the one-element 
test, the Court did not base its holding on OBB’s gravamen test.134 
Sachs argues that, in order to establish a clear, bright-line rule, 
“based upon” should be read as a one-element test.135 Sachs contends 
that OBB’s gravamen test is unclear.136 If courts use the gravamen test, 
judges would have to “concoct an approach for determining the ‘gist 
or essence’ of the lawsuit, with no clear guideposts at hand.”137 
Whereas, under the one-element test, Sachs’s claim is based upon the 
ticket sale because it constitutes the duty element of her claim. 
2.  Attribution is Determined by the Common Law of Agency 
Sachs argues that RPE’s ticket sale is attributable to OBB under 
common law principles of agency.138 Sachs rejects OBB’s contention 
that FSIA’s definition of “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” 
exclusively governs the relationship between RPE and OBB. FSIA is 
the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction over a foreign state; it does not 
determine the entire inquiry of an exception’s meaning.139 Thus, a 
plaintiff need only assert that one of the FSIA exceptions applies to 
the case, not that FSIA controls all questions relating to the case.140  
Furthermore, FSIA is meant to codify the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, which “is designed to treat foreign states like 
private actors when such states operate as ‘every day participants’ in 
 
 131.  Id. at 37 (citing Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 132.  Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993). 
 133.  Id. at 358. 
 134.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 39. 
 135.  Id. at 40–41. 
 136.  Id. at 43–44. 
 137.  Id. at 44. In response, OBB asserts that the one-element test would also complicate 
matters because it would “requir[e] courts to analyze the elements of each state law claim.” 
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 13. 
 138.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 12–23. In her brief, Sachs addressed the 
attribution issue first and then turned to the “based upon” requirement because she believes 
“once one properly focuses on the overall commercial activity involved, the precise meaning of 
‘based upon’ is irrelevant here.” Id. at 27. 
 139.  Id. at 14 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473–78 (2003)). 
 140.  Id. 
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the marketplace.” 141 Private actors would be subject to the common 
law principles of agency. Therefore, the common law on agency should 
apply to foreign sovereigns if they are liable under a FSIA 
exception.142 If foreign states decide to use agents, then “attributing 
the agents’ actions to the states ensures that all commercial actors in 
this country are treated alike.”143 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Although Sachs is likely to prevail in asserting that the “based 
upon” requirement should be construed according to the one-element 
test, RPE’s ticket sale should not be attributed to OBB. Under the 
Bancec test, RPE’s ticket sale is not OBB’s action. 
At the outset the parties disagree as to the order of the issues. 
OBB claims that the “based upon” inquiry is the first question,144 but 
Sachs asserts that attribution should be considered first.145 The Court 
should first decide the “based upon” inquiry. This order is plainly part 
of the logic of Saudi Arabia v. Nelson: “We begin our analysis by 
identifying the particular conduct on which the Nelsons’ action is 
‘based’ for purposes of the Act.”146 The Court should address the 
issues in this same order. If the Court determines that Sachs’s action is 
not “based upon” a commercial activity, the attribution question is 
irrelevant because even if RPE’s activity is attributable, it cannot 
trigger an exception to foreign sovereign immunity. 
A.  Mincing Words: The “Based Upon” Requirement of the 
Commercial-Activity Exception 
Sachs will likely prevail as to the meaning of “based upon” with 
her one-element test applied on a claim-by-claim basis under Nelson. 
Sachs’s course of conduct theory is erroneous. Although Sachs 
offers a clever way of reading the statute by parsing the distinctions 
between “activity” and “act” with the clauses of the subsection of the 
statute, her claim undermines the restrictive theory of sovereign 
 
 141.  Id. at 15 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 at 7 (1976)). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id.. 
 144.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 28 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 
356–57 (1993)). 
 145.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 27; but see Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 6, OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S. 
Apr. 24, 2015) (addressing the attribution question before the “based upon” question). 
 146.  Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356 (1993). 
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immunity. The restrictive theory allows for exceptions to sovereign 
immunity in “cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly commercial 
acts.”147 Expanding “commercial activity” to include general conduct 
would allow plaintiffs to file actions with tenuous connections to the 
United States, in direct conflict with the essential presumption that a 
foreign state is immune from suit.148 
For example, in Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France149 the 
plaintiff sued a foreign airline after one of its employees accidentally 
ran over his foot while on the job. Santos argued that his claim was 
based on a lease between Air France and his employer.150 The court 
found that his action was not based on a commercial activity because 
the contract had nothing to do with his claim. “[I]f it had been [any 
other airline’s] employee who had been driving, Santos would [have 
sued] one of those airlines instead” regardless of whether there was a 
lease or not.151 Under Sachs’s broad theory, however, Santos’s claim 
would stem simply from Air France’s commercial activity of operating 
as an airline. Even though his claim has nothing to do with being a 
passenger on an airline, and therefore he has no common carrier 
relationship with Air France, Santos could bring suit against a foreign 
instrumentality simply because the sovereign chose to operate an 
airline. This undermines the narrow view of the restrictive theory. 
Sachs is nonetheless correct that the Court should apply the one-
element test for the “based upon” requirement, as several circuit 
courts have already held.152 OBB claims that the gravamen test is 
superior because it would minimize the dangers of artful pleading,153 
but the one-element test avoids this artful pleading concern. By 
asserting that an element of a claim is based upon a commercial 
activity in the United States, a plaintiff must directly connect the 
action to the United States. The only risk of artful pleading Sachs’s 
one-element test presents is that if the plaintiff can assert one element 
of one claim, then the entire action would be based upon a 
 
 147.  Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983). 
 148.  Nelson, 507 U.S. at 355. 
 149.  934 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 150.  Id. at 892. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Santos v. 
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1991); Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of 
Civil Aviation of China, 822 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 153.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 35 (citing Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363). 
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commercial activity.154 However, the Ninth Circuit went through a 
claim-by-claim analysis of Sachs’s lawsuit.155 Therefore, those claims 
lacking substantial contact with the United States would be dismissed. 
Considering this, the Court should hold not only that the one-element 
test is correct, but also that it should be performed on a claim-by-
claim basis. 
B.  It’s (Not Really) Complicated: Bancec, FSIA, and the Relationship 
of OBB and RPE 
Although Sachs should succeed on the “based upon” issue, OBB 
correctly asserts that the Bancec two-pronged test should apply. 
OBB errs with its first argument that FSIA directly controls the 
attribution issue.156 FSIA “indisputably governs the determination of 
whether a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity,”157 not if 
actions are attributable to it.158 
In fact, OBB cites to cases that undercut its own argument, such as 
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson159 and Samantar v. Yousuf.160 In Dole, the 
plaintiffs were not trying to attribute liability to a foreign sovereign; 
they wanted to attribute their actions to the sovereign to seek 
immunity.161 Similarly, in Samantar, the former Prime Minister of 
Somalia was seeking foreign sovereign immunity under the “agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state” definition in § 1603(b).162 The Court 
used the statutory language in both cases because defendants were 
trying to achieve sovereign immunity, not because plaintiffs wanted to 
attribute an agent’s actions in order to exempt defendants from 
immunity. 
On the other hand, Sachs’s assertion that common law agency 
rules apply to this case is also incorrect. Sachs argues that “FSIA is 
designed to treat foreign states like private actors when such states 
operate as ‘every day participants’ in the marketplace.”163 This 
 
 154.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 49. 
 155.  Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 599–602 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 156.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 39. 
 157.  Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010). 
 158.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 18. 
 159.  538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
 160.  560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 161.  Dole, 538 U.S. at 471. 
 162.  Samantar, 560 U.S. at 314–15. 
 163.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 15 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 at 7 
(1976)). 
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argument puts the cart before the horse. The foreign sovereign is only 
treated like a private actor when it falls under one of the FSIA 
exceptions. Sachs would have the Court treat a foreign sovereign like 
a private actor in order to reach the FSIA exception. Common law 
principles could only possibly apply if the foreign sovereign is already 
liable under an FSIA exception. Sachs cannot use the restrictive 
theory in order to create a loophole in FSIA. 
The Court should use the Bancec two-pronged test to determine 
attribution under FSIA because that case provides a clear rule for 
determining when a foreign sovereign is clearly acting through an 
agent. Bancec correctly declares that “government instrumentalities 
established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their 
sovereign should normally be treated as such.”164 Furthermore, the 
first prong of Bancec focuses on the control the foreign sovereign 
exerts over the entity.165 This allows for liability when the foreign 
sovereign is clearly acting through the agent. Nonetheless, it also 
mitigates this liability; a foreign sovereign who has no control over an 
entity cannot direct the entity to act on its behalf. If there is control 
under Bancec, then the foreign sovereign has clearly assented to the 
relationship with the entity. 
The present case exemplifies why Bancec’s test is the most 
consistent with FSIA’s purpose. The Ninth Circuit attributed RPE’s 
ticket sale to OBB even though OBB had no control over RPE.166 It is 
absurd to attribute RPE’s commercial activity to OBB. RPE is a 
travel agent working for the Eurail Group, of which OBB is a 
member, along with nearly thirty other rail services.167 Although the 
Eurail Group’s actions arguably can be attributed to OBB because 
OBB has some control over that group, the same cannot be said for 
RPE. RPE operates independently of both OBB and the Eurail 
Group. RPE sells train tickets to American citizens not just for OBB 
but for other Eurail Group members. OBB is simply too many 
degrees removed from the American vendor for the commercial-
activity exception to reasonably apply in this case. 
The second prong of Bancec addresses Sachs’s concern that 
without common law agency principles, foreign states could use non-
 
 164.  Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983). 
 165.  Id. at 630. 
 166.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 53. 
 167.  Id. at 54. 
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attributable entities to operate in the United States without fear of 
liability.168 If a foreign sovereign is abusing the corporate structure in 
order to “work fraud or injustice” and circumvent otherwise 
applicable liability, the Court should ignore the corporate structure. 
Indeed, this was the exact outcome of Bancec.169 
Finally, in comparing the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the Court’s 
recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, OBB presents a 
particularly compelling case to the Court in light of international 
comity.170 Comity has been a concern of the Court since The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon. The Court disfavors getting involved in 
foreign policy issues, and its decision in Daimler directly refers to this 
concern.171 In Daimler, the Court held that foreign private companies 
could not be subject to general personal jurisdiction unless the 
entity’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ 
as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”172 The same 
concern for comity should influence the Court’s determination of 
foreign sovereign immunity. If private companies cannot be held 
under personal jurisdiction for their particular activities in the United 
States, it seems completely anomalous to hold foreign sovereigns 
liable for activities performed by third-party entities over which the 
state has no control.173 
CONCLUSION 
Foreign sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that treads a fine 
line between law and politics. At one point, it was almost exclusively 
political; the United States would make foreign sovereign immunity 
decisions purely on foreign policy grounds.174 Today, FSIA and the 
restrictive theory have pushed the decision into the judicial realm, 
with a continued emphasis on the importance of international comity. 
Due to the deep connection between the law and foreign affairs, legal 
questions regarding the scope of FSIA risk encroaching on the policy 
side of the law. The Court should keep this frame of reference in mind 
when it decides this case. It should conclude that the “based upon” 
 
 168.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 15. 
 169.  Bancec, 462 U.S. at 632. 
 170.  134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 171.  Id. 763. 
 172.  Id. at 761 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 173.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 63. 
 174.  See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (recounting the 
history of the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine). 
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requirement is governed by the one-element test under Saudi Arabia 
v. Nelson on a claim-by-claim basis, but that Bancec should control the 
determination of attribution of a non-sovereign entity’s actions to a 
foreign sovereign. 
 
